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Abstract 
This work proposes a novel approach to augment program risk management processes by introducing complexity-based risk 
evaluation which potentially exposes risks that would have otherwise been neglected.  The approach is to determine the complexity-
based risks by first evaluating system, observer, and behavior entropy models.  The suggested metrics created by the models provide 
the framework for generating complexity-based risks.  The results can be used by program management to aid in decision-making 
processes.  The results can also be shared with customers to determine any appropriate short and long-term mitigation actions. The 
suggested metric are applied to a sample case study. Future work will include impact analysis and mitigation strategies for 
complexity-based risks. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk assessment of engineered systems designs have been of great interest to program managers as well as all 
stakeholders of engineered systems. Risks have a future potential consequence based on a root cause.  Program 
management desires visibility into these causes and consequences. Investigations are performed by expert team 
members and the data is compiled for evaluation of probability and consequences.  Since risk assessments are created 
by individuals based on their rational opinions, they are inherently subjective and vulnerable to biases.  A set of risks 
may even be neglected due to the subjective nature of the process [1].  Where system complexity is concerned, the 
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root causes may not be discovered without a framework to help guide the evaluation.  This work proposes a method 
that augments the existing risk management process to expose complexity-based risks that may otherwise have not 
been readily apparent. 
This paper begins with a literature review on system complexity and risk and a reference definition of complexity 
is established.  The reference complexity definition is used to develop a system, observer, and behavior entropy model 
using the Goal, Question, Metric (GQM) method.  Complexity metrics are derived and evaluated for significant 
probability of occurrence.  Finally, complexity-based risks are compiled and evaluated for probability of occurrence.  
A case study is described and evaluated using the proposed methodology. 
2. Literature review 
A definition of complexity, herein referred to as the ‘reference definition’, is the degree of difficulty in accurately  
predicting future behavior such that complexity is determined by the system being observed, the capabilities of the 
observer, and the behavior that the observer is attempting to predict [2] [3].  Peter Erdi indicates that complex systems 
properties include aspects of circular causality, feedback loops, small changes resulting in out-of-proportion results, 
and Emergence/unpredictability [4].  Erdi’s definition in the context of the reference definition is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Complexity definition correlation: Erdi [4] 
Reference definition Erdi complexity aspects 
Complexity is determined by: The system being observed System properties that allow for difficult to explain behavior 
(Circular causality, Feedback loops, logical paradoxes, strange loop) 
Complexity is determined by: The capabilities of the 
observer 
System produces responses of scale unexpected by observer (Small 
changes resulting in out-of-proportion results) 
Complexity is determined by: The behavior that the 
observer is attempting to predict 
System has some aspect that is unpredictable / emergent 
 
Sargut and McGrath indicate that predictability is the primary distinction between a complicated system and a 
complex system.  Complex systems are predictable in that they have been designed to continuously adjust, but not 
predictable in that the system reacts to a host of stimuli [5].  The Sargut and McGrath definition in the context of the 
reference definition is given in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Complexity Definition Correlation: Sargut and McGrath [5] 
Reference definition Sargut and McGrath complexity aspects 
Complexity is determined by: The system being observed Unintended consequences result from simple actions 
Complexity is determined by: The capabilities of the 
observer 
Observer has difficulty “making sense of a situation.”  “Human 
beings’ cognitive limits mean that no manager (observer) can 
understand all aspects of the business (system)” 
Complexity is determined by: The behavior that the 
observer is attempting to predict 
Predictability is the primary distinction between and a complex 
system and a merely complicated system.  “Rare events are more 
significant than average ones.”  Interaction of various parts of the 
system result in unpredicted results 
 
The MIT Engineering Systems Division (ESD) defines a complex system as a “system with components and 
interconnections, interactions, or interdependencies that are difficult to describe, understand, predict, manage, design, 
or change” [6].  The MIT ESD definition in the context of the reference definition is given in Table 3. 
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Table 3 - Complexity Definition Correlation: MIT ESD [6] 
Reference definition MIT ESD complexity aspects 
Complexity is determined by: The system being observed System interdependencies may unintended;  dynamic system; many 
intricately connected components 
Complexity is determined by: The capabilities of the 
observer 
Components and interconnections, interactions, or interdependencies 
the observer finds difficult to describe, understand, predict, manage, 
design, or change 
Complexity is determined by: The behavior that the 
observer is attempting to predict 
The complexity of a system can be quantifiable, but what makes a 
system appear complicated to the observer is subjective; How 
complicated the system appears depends on the nature of the 
interface of the system that is presented to its users. 
 
Similarly, Dodder and Dare of MIT indicate that Complex Adaptive Systems, a category of complex systems have 
a high degree of difficulty accurately predicting future behavior [7]. Sheard and Mostashari indicate that dynamic 
complexity includes system behavior and evolving complexity versus time [8].  MITRE created a Systems Engineering 
Profiler tool to quantify program complexity [9].  The tool objective is to quantify mission evolution, effort scope, 
effort scape, acquisition environment and stakeholder relationship stability.  Nilchiani et al. evaluated risk management 
techniques and proposed an objective risk management framework [1].  The novel risk management approach 
identifies sources of complexity in a completely objective manner. 
Several research groups participated in the 2011 DARPA META II Complex Systems Design and Analysis 
(CODA).  One of the relevant questions was regarding complexity metrics, the metrics relevance to 
schedule/cost/reliability, and how useful the metrics are in comparing alternate designs.  A participating research group 
from Boeing Company, Purdue University, and Arizona State University selected a wide range of complexity metrics 
for evaluation against schedule/cost/reliability data sets from real world programs to create a composite, abstract 
complexity metric [10].  The team performed a statistical analysis to identify correlations between computed metrics 
and the observed behavior of cost/schedule/reliability and found strong correlations for particular metrics.  The team 
indicated that comparing complexity metrics between system types would not be advisable.  A participating research 
group from Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed entropy-based metrics and used them to characterize 
uncertainty in the system development processes [11].  The objective was to quantify complexity in a way that it can 
be managed during development.  This research proposes a statistical method for generating a complexity curve based 
on entropy and maximum entropy.  Another participating research group from United Technologies Corporation 
Complex Systems Design and Analysis (CODA) produced an architectural design space exploration method.  User 
defined data inputs and iterations on the model determine the best architecture [12].  
The Aerospace Corporation developed a complexity analysis for NASA missions which includes complexity index 
computations for comparisons between programs [13].  The index consists of system design parameters, the estimated 
complexity of the parameters, and an aggregate complexity for the system.  Suh proposed axiomatic design principles 
to aid in design decision making, particularly for complex systems.  Suh proposed a means to tie complexity to the 
probability of satisfying requirements [14]. The DARPA funded Abstraction Based Complexity Management effort 
completed by United Technologies Corporation proposes an abstraction based enumeration technique for complexity-
based system design.  Complexity numbers are created for potential system architectures which are then modeled 
against design and uncertainty models for determination of the optimal architecture [15].   
3. Complexity-based risk evaluation 
Certain forms of system complexity are inherently difficult to identify and characterize which makes aspects of 
complexity prone to be ignored during the course of standard program risk management processes.  This section 
describes creation and evaluation of complexity-based risk assessments using established complexity definitions.  This 
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work is not intended to replace the existing risk management processes but to augment it with a mechanism to identify 
complexity-based risks that would otherwise have been neglected. 
3.1. Complexity definition and aspects of complexity 
The reference definition of complexity suggested by the literature search is “the degree of difficulty in accurately 
predicting future behavior” such that complexity is determined by the system being observed, the capabilities of the 
observer and the behavior that the observer is attempting to predict.  The reference definition contains the key aspects 
of the other definitions found in the literature search (see Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3).  This reference definition 
will be used for subsequent complexity-based risk development in this effort.   
Complexity can be of a structural nature.  Structural complexity deals with architecture connectivity such as the 
number of subsystems and the quantity of different types of interfaces.  Structural complexity is relatively easy to 
identify.  Dynamic complexity refers to the behavior or responses of the system which can be much more difficult to 
identify.  Dynamic complexity can include adaptive responses, non-linear changes, self-organization and “emergent 
behavior.”  Socio-political complexity deals with human aspects like stakeholders and political environments.  
Although not conclusively demonstrated by this effort, structural complexity is probably more readily identified by 
standard risk management techniques since it is visually observable in architecture diagrams.  For this reason the case 
study investigated later in this work focuses on dynamic and socio-political complexity-based risk. 
3.2. Complexity-based risk investigation 
The next step is determining how our understanding of complexity can help the systems engineer evaluate 
complexity-based risks in a system.  The well-established GQM method [16] [17] is used to develop metrics.  The 
Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach was designed as a top-down software measurement approach to assist in 
project planning, to determine strengths and weaknesses of software or process, to determine benefits of refinement 
techniques, and to evaluate product/process quality. Using a top-down approach is important since the number of 
possible metrics viewed from the ‘bottom’, or at the implementation level, is very large. The only way to properly 
represent the desired measurements is by understanding the context in which they are needed. The principle of GQM 
is that project goals (the conceptual level) must drive questions (the operational level) which are represented by metrics 
(the quantitative level) (see Figure 1).  Metrics are a system of measurement, and in our case the metrics will be used 
as potential indicators of risk.   
 
 
Figure 1 - GQM hierarchical structure [17] 
The goals in Table 4 are determined from the reference definition that complexity is the degree of difficulty in 
accurately predicting future behavior such that complexity is determined by  
x the system being observed 
x the capabilities of the observer 
x the behavior that the observer is attempting to predict 
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For the GQM Model, the following definitions will apply: 
x System Mission includes requirements, uses, scale, scope 
x System Environment includes physical, programmatic, acquisition, political, stakeholder 
Table 4 – Generic complexity metric GQM model 
System entropy model 
Goal  Know and project the system context 
Question What are the projected system contexts? 
Entropy 
Metrics 
ps1=what is the probability that the system mission cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
ps2=What is the probability that the system environment cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
Observer entropy model 
Goal Know and project observer capabilities 
Question What are the observer capabilities to project system context and system behaviors? 
Entropy 
Metrics 
po1=What is the probability that the observer cannot easily/accurately project/navigate the system mission in timeframe t? 
po2=What is the probability that the observer cannot easily/accurately project/navigate the system environment in timeframe t?  
Behavior entropy model 
Goal Know and project system behaviors 
Question What are the projected system behaviors? 
Entropy 
Metrics 
pb1= What is the probability that the systems behaviors for the actual mission cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in 
timeframe t? 
pb2= What is the probability that the systems behaviors for the actual environment cannot be easily/accurately 
projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
 
The metrics are intended to be generic responses to the questions, but adaptations may be applied for different fields 
of study.  Similarly, the generic metric categories are provided with the expectation that further field/system/program-
specific derivations will be made.  For example, aspects of the mission and environment can be independent questions 
instead of being grouped.  Adding questions on uses, scale, scope, physical, programmatic, acquisition, political, 
stakeholder, etc. results in creation of independent metrics.  See Table 5 for a summary of the steps in the complexity-
based risk determination methodology. 
Table 5 – Complexity-based risk determination methodology 
Step 1  Evaluate the Generic Complexity Metrics GQM for the specific program or case 
Step 2 Determine complexity metrics for the specific program or case 
Step 3 Group metrics into risk areas (as needed) 
Step 4 Perform complexity-based risk evaluation using the complexity metrics 
 
Once the complexity metrics are derived and evaluated, those that are not extremely improbable are carried forward.  
The metrics carried forward provide guidance for the complexity-based risk creation. Complexity-based risks are 
compiled, merged as necessary, and evaluated for probability of occurrence.  Evaluation of the probabilities can be 
approached using methods already used in systems engineering risk management.  A log based scale may be preferable 
for evaluating lower likelihood conditions.  Both linear and log scales are shown in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2 – Probability of occurrence definition 
3.3. Case study 
Next, this investigation uses the proposed methodology to create complexity-based risks for a sample Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) radar system.  First start with a set of requirements and a sample set of risks created using standard risk 
management processes.  The DoD generated a set of requirements for its next generation transportable ATC radar 
system in 2012 [18].  There are more than 800 requirements, so key performance/behavior related requirements will 
be assessed for risks in this example.  See Table 6  for the selected requirements and associated risks.  Evaluate the 
Probability of Failure (Pf) using standard risk management estimation technique.  Programmatic risks associated with 
similar types of programs have been listed. 
Table 6 – Program and requirements based risk assessment 
Requirement Risk Pf 
<<1>> The PSR and SSR shall detect and process a minimum of 700 real aircraft targets in any 
mix of PSR only, PSR/SSR merge, or SSR only targets, in the presence of up to an additional 
300 false PSR reports and 100 false SSR reports (due to False-Replies Unsynchronized-in-Time 
(FRUIT), synchronous garble, or multipath) uniformly or non-uniformly distributed in azimuth 
for a 360 degree scan, and not be impacted by weather channel processing. (T=O) 
If the data processor cannot support 
the required load, then processing 
capabilities updates will impact cost 
estimate.  
10% 
<<6>> Target signals received at the PSR and the SSR antenna shall be processed and displayed 
on all D-RAPCON ATC controller displays in less than 2.2 seconds from the time of signal 
reception at the PSR or SSR antenna receive ports. (T=O) 
If architecture fails latency test, then 
architecture modifications will delay 
first delivery. 
20% 
<<23>> In the clear, the PSR shall have a single scan Probability of detection (Pd) ı 80% (T), 
> 90% (O), for a one square meter RCS, Swerling-1 type target, within the detection volume as 
defined herein section 3.2.2.3, PSR Detection Probability Volume at a Probability of False 
Alarm (PFA) İ10-6 over 92 percent of the target radial velocities between -700 and +700 
knots. 
If the radar fails the Pd acceptance 
test the system budgets will need to 
be reevaluated impacting the 
delivery schedule. 
10% 
<<36>> Under normal clutter conditions the PSR shall report targets prior to scan-to-scan 
correlation with a maximum of 100 false search reports per scan in three consecutive scans. 
If the radar fails the Pfa acceptance 
test the system budgets will need to 
be reevaluated impacting the 
delivery schedule. 
10% 
<<37>> The PSR shall detect, categorize, and report precipitation within the six reflectivity 
levels (18 dBZ to 57 dBZ) defined by the National Weather Service (NWS). (T=O) 
Assessed as ‘no risk’ - 
Program risks Pf 
If modifications to the existing transportable radar product delay manufacturing, then liquidated damages of $TBD/week will be incurred 10% 
If system fails environmental qualification testing, cost will be incurred for redesign/re-sourcing and subsequent requalification testing. 10% 
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The risks created using requirements as a guide are potentially useful in the context of the program and a sample 
solution.  Next, apply the proposed complexity-based risk technique using the complexity aspects indicated in Table 
7.   Table 7 is a metrics summary table (derived from Table 4).  It provides a down-selection of the aspects of the 
mission and environment applied to the sample system to communicate exactly what is being evaluated.  For this 
example, let the timeframe ‘t’ include the duration of the contract and several years of deployment. 
Table 7 – Aspects of sample metrics selected for application to the case study 
Model Mission Environment 
System What is the probability that ________ result in a system that cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
 ps1: aspects of the system requirements, uses scale/scope ps2: development environment, political, programmatic, 
acquisition, stakeholder  
Observer What is the probability that the observer cannot easily/accurately project/navigate _______ in timeframe t? 
 po1: subsystem/interface performance  po2: technology supportability  
Behavior What is the probability that _________ cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
 pb1: failures during manufacturing, selloff, testing, fielding;  
repair/replace behaviors  
pb2: obsolescence behaviors; behavior while adding new 
customer features/capabilities 
  
 
Next, complexity metrics are compiled in Table 8 for the sample system.  In cases where a risk evaluation is 
desirable p>EI is listed as ‘yes.’  Extremely Improbable (EI) indicates an area where the evaluation identifies no 
significant risk.  The entropy model in Table 8 is the realization of Table 5, Step 2 for the case study.  Metrics po2, ps2, 
and pb2 introduce risks related to the future environments. 
Table 8 –Complexity metrics for the case study  
 System entropy model  
# Metric  p>EI? Detail 
ps1 What is the probability that the requirements cannot be 
easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
Yes Similar result to the standard evaluation in Table 6.   
ps2 What is the probability that the uses/scope/physical 
environment cannot be easily/accurately 
projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
Yes Radar system may be deployed for military efforts, 
humanitarian efforts, and future endeavors of 
military TBD.  Deployed landscape changes (legal 
but encroaching spectrum uses, windmills, 
technology available to create purposeful 
interference) 
ps3 What is the probability that the scale cannot be 
easily/accurately projected/navigated in timeframe t? 
No Past systems of this type have been moderately 
scaled.  Planning done together with industry and 
academia 
ps4 What is the probability that the acquisition environment 
cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in 
timeframe t? 
No Strong customer relationship. 
ps5 What is the probability that the political environment 
cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in 
timeframe t? 
No There is political pressure to replace ATC radars 
with ADSB; expect military to continue use of 
radar in timeframe ‘t’ 
ps6 What is the probability that the stakeholder environment 
cannot be easily/accurately projected/navigated in 
timeframe t? 
Yes Government and military-industrial staffing 
instability in timeframe ‘t’ drives potential 
stakeholder instability 
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 Observer entropy model  
# Metric  p>EI? Detail 
po1 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the requirements in 
timeframe t? 
No Requirements are at the contractual stage. Changes 
must be negotiated and agreeable by seller/buyer. 
po2 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the uses/scope in 
timeframe t? 
Yes The observer cannot accurately identify the future 
uses and deployment environments of the system  
po3 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the scale in timeframe t? 
No Observer cannot predict, but planning will done 
together with industry and academia and changes 
must be negotiated and agreeable by seller/buyer. 
po4 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the acquisition 
environment in timeframe t? 
Yes Observer cannot predict, due to government 
instability and turnover. 
po5 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the political 
environment in timeframe t? 
Yes Observer cannot predict, due to government 
instability and turnover. 
po6 What is the probability that the observer cannot 
easily/accurately project/navigate the stakeholder 
environment in timeframe t? 
Yes Observer cannot predict, due to government 
instability and turnover. 
 Behavior entropy model  
# Metric  p>EI? Detail 
pb1 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system requirements in timeframe t? 
No Requirements are at the contractual stage. Changes 
must be negotiated and agreeable by seller/buyer. 
pb2 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system uses/scope/physical environment in timeframe t? 
Yes The system behaviors would be impacted by  
variable uses/environment of the radar system 
which may evolve greatly over timeframe ‘t’ 
pb3 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system scale in timeframe t? 
Yes Scaling the system (power, aperture) will not make 
the behavior unpredictable.  Scaling to add features 
could make the system unpredictable, but any 
scaling must be negotiated and will be planned 
together with industry and academia 
pb4 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system acquisition environment in timeframe t? 
No Three past failures of prior transportable ATC 
program places pressure on presiding acquisition 
office to succeed on this attempt. 
pb5 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system political environment in timeframe t? 
No Political environment will not impact system 
behavior 
pb6 What is the probability that the system behaviors cannot 
be easily/accurately projected/navigated for the actual 
system stakeholder environment in timeframe t? 
No Stakeholder environment will not impact system 
behavior 
 
Note that the ATC system example was selected since it was presumed to be complex.  A complex system must be 
selected for evaluation since there is no point trying to find complexity-based risks for a simple system.  A system can 
be complicated, with many moving parts, but the outcome of operation can usually be understood and predicted.  
Complex systems may be predictable in that they have been designed to continuously adjust, but not predictable in 
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that the system reacts to a host of stimuli.  Air traffic control systems are selected as complex because the systems 
have to adapt to a host of inputs like weather, time of day, ground traffic, air traffic, biologic clutter, etc. resulting in 
different system behaviors.  Stimuli that don’t happen very often make it hard for the observer to evaluate a complex 
system because they do not happen frequently enough for us to understand how the system will respond. 
Applying the reference definition to an ATC system, we would have to consider it to be moderately complex.  Even 
though it is adapting, all of the adaptations and states of the system are designed and well understood.  The area that 
the radar is operating in, however, generally covers more than 10,000 square miles and is used for many other purposes 
other than landing aircraft.  Consequently, there are cases when the system will need to operate in conditions 
(potentially outside of requirements) that result in behavior that cannot be accurately predicted.  In general, unintended 
consequences are an effect of complex system (which supports the reference definition of complex systems).  One 
example is when wind farms are installed in direct line-of-site of an existing air traffic control system.  Depending on 
the wind speed and direction, the blades of the windmill are spinning and producing significant radar returns which 
can result in false aircraft detections and masking of aircraft flying over the wind farms (which can cover very 
significant areas).  The observer in the United States will have information that a wind farm is being installed and the 
installation and operation can be planned accordingly.  The DRAPCON radar system example is transportable and 
may be installed in countries which do not regulate windmill installation.  Similarly, they may be installed in countries 
where the environment is known, but bordering on other nations (within the radar coverage) which have unknown 
present/future environments.   Not being informed of a wind-farm installation in advance may result in a failure to 
predict system behavior.  Even the informed observer would have difficulty accurately predicting the system behavior 
if it is the first time the system will encounter this type of environment. 
Another example is the air traffic control system operating spectrum.  In areas of the world where air traffic control 
radar operation can extend into territories of other nations, there can easily be disagreement over which frequencies 
are used for which purposes.  When the air traffic control radar is pointed in the direction of a nation which is using 
that same frequency spectrum for another purpose, the output of the air traffic control system becomes difficult to 
predict.  The characteristics of the interfering signal are likely unknown. 
The next step in the methodology, as indicated by Table 5, Step 3, is to drive risk creation and evaluation of 
consequences using the entropy model in Table 8.  Further evaluation is only performed for metrics with p > EI.  
Metrics are grouped into risk areas, and the significance of the consequences determines whether introducing a new 
risk is justified.  Table 9 contains the new complexity-based risk areas.  The probability is evaluated using the linear 
risk management method (Figure 2).  The new risks introduced in Table 9 augment the risks in Table 6.  
Table 9 –Complexity-based risk evaluation 
Risk Basis  Complexity-metric based risks Pf 
C1 ps1 No new risk needed: coincides with the requirements evaluation in Table 6 - 
C2 ps2, po2, pb2, pb3 If radar is deployed where there is conflicting spectrum use, system performance may degrade 
below requirements.  
40% 
C3 ps2, pb2, pb3 If radar is deployed where there is conflicting coverage volume use, like windmills, system 
performance may degrade below requirements. 
20% 
C4 ps6, po4, 
po5, po6 
If instable stakeholder environment results in loss of key customer allies, then sell-off schedule 
may be extended. 
30% 
 
4. Discussion of results 
This effort proposed a complexity-based risk evaluation framework to augment the traditional risk-management 
process.  This approach is different from prior methods which do not include a guided complexity-based framework.  
Questions are developed based on ‘goals’ which come from a reference definition of complexity.  The metrics are then 
used for complexity-based risk development.  A case study was described and used to generated complexity-based 
metrics and complexity-based risks.  While this preliminary work presented a relatively small-system example, it is 
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hoped that in practical environments use of this framework will reveal additional area of risk not exposed by traditional 
methods even in very large systems and systems of systems. 
The mitigation of the complexity-based risks is forward-thinking and presents the opportunity to shape the future 
product and the customer perception of product quality. For example, risk C2 and C3 could result in potential warrantee 
issues if the customer does not understand why the performance is not meeting expectations.  Even if the risks are not 
realized until after the warrantee expires, the customer may perceive a low product quality impacting stakeholder 
relationships.  Exposing these risks gives the opportunity to set customer expectations or even offer/implement design 
improvements if the customer is amenable. 
With respect to the individual or team generating complexity-based risks, expertise is critical.  Similar to traditional 
risk management, visibility into areas difficult to predict is challenging and should be assigned to the most experienced 
individuals.  Selecting the wrong focus can prevent us from evaluating other factors – which may be the critical factors 
[5].  Also worthy of discussion is the expectation that expert customer and development team complexity-based risk 
evaluations may produce different results.  Different teams (observers) may have better visibility into different aspects 
of the system or its behavior.  This is not a problem with the method, but is indicative of the desirability for convergence 
of understanding between the teams.  Use of the method proposed herein will help expose any different viewpoints for 
resolution. 
5. Conclusions 
Augmenting program risk management processes by adding complexity-based risk management evaluation can 
help expose risks that would have otherwise been neglected. This effort proposed a framework for complexity-based 
risk evaluation and demonstrated its use by way of an example system.  A limitation of complexity-based risk 
evaluation in general is that as a system becomes more complex, we simply cannot fully understand all of the 
knowledge and ignorance measures.  The reference definition of complexity as “the degree of difficulty in accurately 
predicting future behavior” indicates that there will be inherent inaccuracies in predicting the behavior of systems with 
higher complexity.  Since the difficulty of accurately predicting future behavior increases with complexity (by our 
definition), the possibility that we may not recognize all complexity-based risks in advance increases as the complexity 
of a system increases.  What this method proposes is that we can best identify the system complexity-based risks using 
expertly determined knowledge and ignorance measures.   
Future research will include evolution of the framework to improve usability. There is also a need to develop impact 
analysis and mitigation strategies for complexity-based risks.  Future case studies will include different kinds of 
candidate systems and a vetting of the research with industry input.   
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